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STATUTORY LIABILITY OF AGENTS IN INSURANCE
The defendants, officers of an Indiana insurance corporation
not authorized to do business in West Virginia, induced policyholders
to solicit insurance in that state. A West Virginia statute imposed
personal liability upon agents of foreign insurance corporations not
authorized to do business in the state for contracts made by or through
them within the state. Plaintiff, beneficiary of such a policy made
in West Virginia, sued defendants in Indiana on this statute. Held,
for plaintiff. The West Virginia statute will be enforced in Indiana.!
The sundry liabilities of an officer or director of a corporation
usually are determined by the law of the state of incorporation. He
contracts with reference to all the laws of the state in which the
corporation is organized.2 It has been said frequently that foreign
corporations may be excluded from a state entirely or admitted on
conditions.3 For this reason, if the officer of the foreign corporation
is subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the state, 4 that state may
impose statutory liability upon such officer for the acts or omissions
of corporate agents within the state as a condition to doing business
therein.5
A state may -exercise legislative jurisdiction over an officer or
agent of a foreign corporation in three instances: (1) where the
articles of incorporation expressly authorize that business be carried
on in that state;8 (2) where the officer or agent is domiciled in that
state;7 and (3) where the officer or agent, directly or indirectly, has
caused the acts or omissions in that state.8 In the principal case, the
I Karvalsky v. Becker, 29 N. E. (2d) 560 (Ind. 1940).
2Ball v. Anderson, 196 Pa. 86, 46 Atl. 366 (1900); notes (1911) 33
L. R. A. (N. s.) 895, (1891) 13 L. R. A. 56.
3Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28 (1900); State v. In-
surance Co., 115 Ind. 257, 17 N. E. 574 (1888).
4 Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221 (1913); RESTATEMENT, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 191.
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 179.28; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1934) § 188. In some states the agent is liable per-
sonally at common law to the party with whom he deals on an
implied warranty of authority. Lasher v. Stimson, 145 Pa. 30,
23 Atl. 552 (1892). In several states all members of the cor-
poration are liable as partners for acts of the corporation before
compliance. Cunnyngham v. Shelby, 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S. W.
1147 (1916).
Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221 -(1913); Thomas v. Wentworth
Hotel, 158 Cal. 257, 110 Pac. 942 (1910); Pinney v. Nelson, 183
U. S. 144 (1901); Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Furness
[1906] 1 K.B. 49.
7RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 191.
sIbid. The sole Indiana case which touches on these three instances
of proper legislative jurisdiction rests squarely on the first, does
not mention the second, and implies the existence of the third.
Towle v. Beistle, 97 Ind. App. 241, 186 N. E. 344 (1933).
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officers caused their agents to do acts- in West Virginia. Since West
Virginia had legislative jurisdiction over the officers, the statutory
liability was valid if the liability were transitory and if the juris-
diction were not otherwise precluded from enforcing it.
Transitory acts, as distinguished from local, are those which can
be brought wherever the defendant can be found.9 However, some
actions, nominally transitory, cannot be maintained apart from the
place where they arise, for one of several reasons. A court may ap-
ply the doctrine of foram non conveniens, i.e. it admittedly has juris-
diction but refuses enforcement because substantial inconvenience would
result.10 A reason more often given is that it would conflict with
the local public policy of the forum."1 Nor will a court exercise its
jurisdiction if the machinery for enforcement of the foreign claim
is peculiar to the state where the action arose.' 2 Finally, a court will
not enforce a claim based on a "penal" law of another state.'3
Two tests for penalty have been evolved. According to roughly
half the states, the claim is penal if the permissable recovery includes
more than bare compensation, or if it is measured by defendant's
culpability or by any standard other than the extent of the injury.' 4
The Supreme Court in Huntington v. Attrill'5 crystallized a second
test which has been adopted by the other half of the states. "The
question whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects may
be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it
cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the
9 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774); Wheaton, Nature of
Actions-Local and Transitory (1922) 16 I1. L. R. 456.
10 Blair, Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law
(1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1; Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions
(1930) 43 Harv. L. R. 1217.
1A Public policy in the internal sense is defined in Kintz v. Harriger,
99 Ohio St. 240, 246, 124 N. E. 168, 170 (1919). That it may be some-
thing else in the conflict of laws sense is pointed out by Goodrich,
Foreign Facts and Local Fancies (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 26. See
also Kosters, Public Policy in Private International Law (1920)
29 Yale L. J. 745; Nutting, Suggested Limitations on the Public
Policy Doctrine (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 196. The present ten-
dency is toward comity unless the action "in its nature offends
our sense of justice or menaces the public welfare." Cardoza, J.,
in Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N. Y. 99, 110, 120 N. E. 198, 201
(1918). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 612 uses the
term "strong public policy."
12 Mosley v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S. W. 762
(1926). With respect to statutory liability of corporate officers,
see Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 919 (1895).
Contra: Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill. 489, 52 N. E. 346 (1898).
28 The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 123 (U. S. 1825); Carnahan v. Western
Union, 89 Ind. 526 (1883).
' Cary v. Schmeltz, 141 Mo. App. 570, 125 S. W. 532 (1910); Nesbitt
v. Clark, 272 Pa. 161, 116 AtI. 440 (1922); MINOR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1901) § 10. The Restatement adopts the same view, but
qualifies it so that "where the wrong makes the wrongdoer a
statutory party to an already existing duty, the duty is not a
penalty, since the injured person obtains only payment of his
claim." Section 611.
15 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
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question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public
justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured
by the wrongful act."16 This test presupposes that the question of
penalty is to be governed solely by the law of the forum uncontrolled
by any decisions, relevant or irrelevant, of the state whose law raises
the issue.17
Those courts adopting the non-compensatory theory refuse suits
on foreign statutes providing for minimum recovery in certain negli-
gence cases,' 8 and on statutes allowing double or treble damages.19
Likewise, under that theory, statutes creating personal liability upon
officers and directors for acts or omissions are called penal.20 These
statutes are to some extent punitive with respect to those upon whom
liability is imposed, however compensatory they may be to the one in
whose favor the obligation runs. Nevertheless, the reasons for non-
enforcement of the criminal laws of another state2 do not seem to
apply to civil claims, though the statutes giving rise to the claims may
be called "penal." Therefore the Huntington v. Attrill test seems
more desirable. The only justifiable grounds upon which a court
might refuse to enforce such statutory claims would be a local public
policy opposing them,2' or the practical inconveniences, such as ex-
pense of trial, absence of a fair remedy, or undue hardship on the
parties involved in the enforcement. At any rate, the refusal should
not be based on penalty, aside from cases involving criminal statutes.2"
W.D.B. Jr.
'DId. at 673-674.
17Id. at 683; Daury v. Ferraro, 108 Conn. 386, 143 Atl. 630 (1928).
But see Comm. Nat'l Bank v. Kirk, 222 Pa. 567, 71 Atl. 1085(1909) expressing sympathy with the Huntington case, but re-
fusing to enforce a foreign statute when regarded as penal in
the state where enacted. Quaere, does it follow that because a
state treats a statute as penal for some purposes, e.g., strict con-
struction, that it should be held penal, even by the same court,
for purposes of international law? Cf. Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa.
161, 116 Atl. 404 (1922). See also Davis v. Mills, 99 Fed. 39
(C. C. D. Conn. 1900); Cary v. Schmeltz, 141 Mo. App. 570, 125
S. W. 532 (1910).
'
8 Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal And Governmental Claims
(1932) 46 Harv. L. R. 193, n. 39-42.
10 Taylor, Farr & Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 95 Iowa 740, 64 N. W. 660(1895); Mohr v. Sands, 44 Okla. 330, 133 Pac. 238 (1914).
20 Some courts have sought to avoid the issue by discovering a semi-
contractual assumption of the statutory liability in the idea that
the corporate official will be taken to have assented to the legal
consequences of his voluntary acts. Farr v. Brigg's Estate, 72
Vt. 225, 47 Atl. 793 (1900). Or a quasi-contractual obligation
arising either by reason of the creditor's assumed knowledge of
the official's delinquency, which presumably led him to rely on
the statutory right against the official as well as upon the credit
of the corporation. Sherman & Sons Co. v. Bitting, 26 Ga. App.
299, 105 S. E. 848 (1921); Great Western Machine Co. v. Smith,
87 Kan. 331, 124 P. 414 (1912). Or by reason of a contradicting
assumption that by the official's delinquency the creditor was
led to rely unjustifiably upon the credit of the corporation alone.
Ibid. See Leflar, sup-ra note 18.
21 Id. at 198-202.
2See Beach, Uniform Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 Yale
L. J. 656 at 662.
" See Leflar, supra note 18 at 202, n. 28.
